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REBALANCING PROFESSOR ELY'S
REAPPRAISAL OF THE MARSHALL COURT
AND PROPERTY RIGHTS
STEPHEN

A. SIEGEL*

INTRODUCTION

In his paper, The Marshall Court and Property Rights: A
Reappraisal,' Professor Ely seeks to continue the trend of
presenting "a more balanced account of the Marshall Court's
concern with economic rights." In this pursuit, he presents a wellcrafted argument that the "Marshall Court built upon and
expanded the accepted constitutional status of property." Ely's
paper is a work of consensus history, consensus history writ
especially large since he suggests "a strong continuity between
judicial efforts to vindicate private property" from the Marshall to
the Taney to the Lochner era Courts.'
As someone who believes that the history of the constitutional
status of property involves both consensus and controversy,6 I
think Ely's balance requires a bit more balancing. To the extent
there was consensus about property rights in the early Republic,
Ely's work may require supplementation to convey what that
consensus actually entailed. To the extent there was controversy,
Ely's work requires retooling to detail that conflict and its
meaning.
I present three counter-weights to Ely's balance; three
challenges to his reappraisal. I do this not so much to say that Ely
is wrong in some regard, but to bring out the remoteness, the
* Professor of Law, DePaul University College of Law.
1. James W. Ely, The Marshall Court and Property Rights: A Reappraisal,
33 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1023 (2000).
2. Id. at 1025.

3. Id. at 1028.
4. Id. at 1061.
5. See generally id.
6. Stephen A. Siegel, Lochner Era Jurisprudence and the American
Constitutional Tradition, 70 N.C. L. REV. 1, 9-23 (1991) [hereinafter Siegel,
Lochner]; see also Stephen A. Siegel, Understanding the Nineteenth Century
Contract Clause: The Role of the Property-PrivilegeDistinction and "Takings"
Clause Jurisprudence,60 S.C. L. REV. 1 (1986) [hereinafter Siegel, Contract];
Stephen A. Siegel, Let Us Now PraiseInfamous Men, 73 TEX. L. REV. 661, 657701 (1995) (book review).
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distance of the Marshall Court from ourselves; to emphasize that
history frequently explores an unusable past.7 I also present these
counter-weights because I think we would all benefit from
Professor Ely's response to them.
I name the challenges to Professor Ely's analysis after the
contemporary scholars most associated with their formulation.
They are the "Hart/Novak" challenge, the "Treanor/Wood"
challenge, and the "Siegel" challenge.

I.

THE HART/NOVAK CHALLENGE

To be sure, as Professor Ely says, property was a deeply held,
widespread, consensus value in the colonial era, in the early
Republic, and throughout the nineteenth century. But there are
two substantially conflicting visions of what America's
longstanding consensus commitment to property rights entailed.
On the one hand, we have scholars, among whom Ely is
preeminent, who are quite right to remind us that "the belief that
property ownership was essential for self-government and political
liberty [has] long been a central premise of Anglo-American
constitutionalism."8 Ely, in today's paper, and in prior books and
articles,9 accurately recounts the high regard in which property
was held, and the plethora of judicial decisions elaborating
constitutional protections for property.
On the other hand, we have known, since Oscar and Mary
Handlin's study of Massachusetts," and Louis Hartz's study of
Pennsylvania," both published in the late 1940s, and more
recently John Hart's study of the colonial period, 2 and William
Novak's study of nineteenth-century America," both published in
the past few years, that whatever respect America had for
7. See G. Edward White, Recovering the World of the Marshall Court, 33 J.
MARSHALL L. REV. 781 (2000).
8. Ely, supra note 1, at 1001.
9. See, e.g., JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE GUARDIAN OF EVERY OTHER RIGHT: A
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF PROPERTY RIGHTS (2d ed. 1998); JAMES W. ELY,
JR., THE CHIEF JUSTICESHIP OF MELVILLE W. FULLER, 1888-1910 (1995);

James W. Ely, Jr., The Oxymoron Reconsidered: Myth and Reality in the
Origins of Substantive Due Process, 16 CONST. COMMENTARY 315 (1999)
[hereinafter Ely, Oxymoron]; James W. Ely, Jr., "That Due Satisfaction May be
Made:" The Fifth Amendment and the Origins of the Compensation Principle,
36 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 1 (1992) [hereinafter Ely, Due Satisfaction].
10. OSCAR HANDLIN & MARY FLUG HANDLIN, COMMONWEALTH: A STUDY
OF THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT IN THE AMERICAN ECONOMY: MASSACHUSETTS,

1774-1861 (1947).
11. LOUIS

HARTZ,

ECONOMIC

POLICY

AND

DEMOCRATIC

THOUGHT:

PENNSYLVANIA, 1776-1860 (1948).
12. John F. Hart, Colonial Land Use Law and Its Significance for Modern
Takings Doctrine, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1252 (1996).
13. WILLIAM J. NOVAK, THE PEOPLE'S WELFARE: LAW AND REGULATION IN
NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA (1996).
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property rights did not preclude active and intrusive regulation.
The Handlins called it the "commonwealth" concept;14 Novak calls
it "the common law vision of the well-regulated society."15
What we have in our scholarship today is a case of scholars
looking at the same glass and some discussing the half-full part,
and others discussing the half-empty part. I have summed up the
doctrines that allow scholars to talk past each other by saying that
throughout the nineteenth-century, constitutional law protected
vested rights of property, not substantive rights; that
constitutional law protected the possession of property, but not its
value. Among the illustrations of this perception is that, in the
nineteenth century, property was protected from a physical taking
without just compensation while, at the same time, there was no
0
concept of a regulatory taking."
Scholars wishing to assert that nineteenth-century America
extolled property rights write, as Edward Corwin did, of vested
rights protection as the fundamental doctrine of American
constitutional law." Yet scholars wishing to assert the supremacy
of the "people's welfare" and that as a constitutional doctrine
laissez-faire was a myth write, equally truthfully, about the extent
of the police power."8
The truth is that both were going on at the same time. What
we need to understand is how a system of constitutional
protections for property that few today would find intellectually
respectable or politically desirable seemed to its creators to be
eminently satisfying. For a long time, I have been mulling over
this puzzle. We need to understand the economic, social, political
and jurisprudential context that allowed nineteenth-century
jurists to contentedly elaborate a regime of vested rights
protection without substantive rights protection.
If we can
understand this I think we will see the distinct differences, as well
as similarities, between the institution of property two hundred
years ago and now. Let me give an analogy. Nineteenth-century
Americans celebrated their personal freedoms while they lived
with a free speech doctrine that most of us today would find
thoroughly oppressive."

14. 0. HANDLIN & M. HANDLIN, supra note 10, at 28-31. See also LEONARD
LEVY, THE LAW OF THE COMMONWEALTH AND CHIEF JUSTICE SHAW 305-15
(1957) (discussing the "commonwealth idea").
15. NOVAK, supra note 13, at 19-50.
16. Siegel, Contract, supra note 6, at 76-81; Siegel, Lochner, supra note 6,
at 6-10.
17. Edward Corwin, The FundamentalDoctrine of American Constitutional
Law, 12 MICH. L. REV. 247 (1914).
18. See, e.g., NOVAK, supra note 13.
19. See DAVID M. RABBAN, FREE SPEECH IN ITS FORGOTTEN YEARS 129-176
(1997).
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II. THE TREANOR/WOOD CHALLENGE
So far we have been assuming that America's notion of
property rights always included protection for vested rights from
legislative interference. This is a questionable assumption. Some
years ago, there was a scholarly exchange between William
Treanor and Ely over the norm that government should pay just
compensation whenever it seized property. Treanor argued that
the norm was only emergent in the founding era."° Ely responded
that it was already well-established. 2 I will not review Treanor's
and Ely's differences; I note them only as background for saying
that just this past year Gordon Wood renewed the challenge in his
essay on The Originsof Vested Rights in the Early Republic."
Wood's analysis is filled with evidence of a right in flux, a
right just germinating. "By the time of the American Revolution,"
he writes, "most educated Englishmen had become convinced that
their rights existed only against the Crown. Against their
representative and sovereign Parliament, which was the guardian
of these rights, they existed not at all."" And, when Alexander
Hamilton in 1787, gave voice to the view that the constitutional
norm of due process was a judicially enforceable norm limiting
legislative power to fashion law, in Wood's view it was "a novel
twist." 4 In Ely's view, a view that he also published just this past
year, Hamilton's argument was old hat, reflecting a doctrine found
in Blackstone and Lord Coke before him that common law due
process had substantive content binding even Parliament."
Time prohibits detailing my concerns on both sides of this
debate. I only observe that the overall lesson of Jack Rakove's
Pulitzer Prize winning study of the Constitution's framing,
entitled Original Meanings,6 is that the Framers' provided no
clear answer for many fundamental issues which we today still
find controversial. Instead there was a range of answers, some of
which were only emergent as the process of constitutional
This
drafting, ratification, and implementation proceeded.
understanding of our constitutional origins stands at odds with the
typical originalist approach that the founding era provided clear
20. William Treanor, Note, The Origins and Original Significance of the
Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment, 94 YALE L.J. 694, 695-708
(1985).
21. Ely, Due Satisfaction, supra note 9.
22. Gordon S. Wood, The Origins of Vested Rights in the Early Republic, 85
VA. L. REv. 1421 (1999).
23. Id. at 1426.
24. Id. at 1437.
25. Ely, Oxymoron, supra note 9 at 320-27. I am aware of only one scholar
who previously advocated Ely's position. Robert Riggs, Substantive Due
Process in 1791, 1990 WIS. L. REv. 941 (1990).
26. JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE
MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION (1996).
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to most

fundamental

issues.27

Of course, just

compensation and vested rights protection for property may have
been an issue on which, unlike most others, there was a clear
social norm that the founding generation intended to protect.28
But I think there is much to the argument that invites further
exploration. For example, by my count, as late as 1800, only three
of the original thirteen states had an express just compensation
clause in their constitution.29 Just compensation may have been
an established legislative practice, as Ely has argued on another
occasion. 30 But as Christine Desan has shown in her studies of
colonial and founding era treatment of contract claims against the
states: legislative practice and constitutional right are not
necessarily equivalent -especially when claims on the public
treasury are involved.31

III. THE SIEGEL CHALLENGE
The final challenge is my own. I suggest that the Marshall
Court's work in developing constitutional protections for property
involved controversy as well as consensus.
Ely writes that antebellum America extolled property rights.
27. For a discussion of Rakove's treatment of the founding and originalism
see Stephen A. Siegel, Book Review, 17 LAw AND HIST. REV. 410 (1999)
(reviewing JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE
MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION (1996)).
28. Even Rakove thinks that for some issues the Framers and ratifiers had
clear answers. See Jack Rakove, Statement on the Background and History of
Impeachment, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 682, 686-87, 690-91 (1999) (founding
generation did not intend that misleading a civil jury was an impeachable
offense); See also Jack Rakove, The Origins of JudicialReview: A Plea for New
Contexts, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1031, 1041, 1047 (1997) (founding generation
intended judicial review); Jack Rakove, Reading Today's Bias into "Original
Intent," L.A. TIMES, May 28, 1995, pt. M., at 2 (founding generation intended
to deny states the power to impose term limits on congressional office holding).
Rakove teaches us, however, to be deeply suspicious of scholars who always
find clear answers to a great variety of questions.
29. This comment is based on a study of the constitutions of the original
thirteen states in 1-11 SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS OF UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTIONS (William Swindler ed., 1973-88). In 1800, the governing state
constitutions with just compensation provisions were DEL. CONST. of 1792,
MASS. CONST. of 1780, AND PA. CONST. of 1790.
The governing state
constitutions without just compensation clauses were CONN. CONST. of 1776,
GA. CONST. of 1798, MD. CONST. of 1776, N.H. CONST. of 1784, N.J. CONST. of
1776, N.Y. CONST. of 1777, N.C. CONST. of 1776, R.I. CHARTER of 1663, S.C.
CONST. of 1790, and VA. CONST. of 1776. States admitted after 1789 tended to
have just compensation clauses, as did the Northwest Ordinance
30. Ely, Due Satisfaction, supra note 9, at 1.
31. See Christine Desan, The Constitutional Commitment to Legislative
Adjudication in the Early American Tradition, 111 HARV. L. REv. 1381, 138391, 1495-1503 (1998); Christine Desan, Remaking Constitutional Tradition at
the Margin of the Empire: The Creation of Legislative Adjudication in Colonial
New York, 16 LAW AND HIST. REv. 257, 257-64 (1998).
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I have written that they extolled property rights but were divided
over rights of privilege.32 Wealth in nineteenth-century America
was not a unitary concept. Wealth was divided into property,
which denoted valuables whose acquisition was open to all
individuals, typically through competition in the free market; and
privilege, which signified valuables that only certain individuals
could acquire, usually through designation by affirmative
governmental act. Property was a consensus value; privilege was
controversial. To overstate the point, some Americans thought
The
privilege as sacrosanct as property; others did not.
specially
created
by
corporation, usually large-scale enterprise
negotiated charter was the litmus test for where one stood on the
issue. I place John Marshall and Joseph Story on the privilege
regarding side of my dichotomy. I think the issue split the
Marshall Court. I certainly think the stance generally taken by
the Marshall Court distinguishes it from the Taney and Waite
Courts.
If you accept my property/privilege distinction, I think
Marshall most frequently leaned, or tilted in favor of privilege,
applying, if not fashioning, doctrines favorably to the claims of
privilege. Consider New Jersey v. Wilson,33 the origin of the
doctrine that a state may contract away its power to tax, a
doctrine that became exceedingly controversial after Marshall
passed from the scene.3 4
New Jersey v. Wilson involved a 1758 land transaction
between New Jersey and an Indian tribe in which the tribe
released its claim to some land and the State, in return, conveyed
other land to trustees for the tribe's benefit. The trustees were
prohibited from leasing or alienating the land, and the land was
exempted from taxation. The Indians occupied the land until in
1801 when they requested the legislature to authorize the trustees
to sell the land so that the tribe might move to another locale.
Acceding to the request, the legislature empowered the trustees to
divide and sell the tribe's land. After the land was sold, the
purchasers claimed the benefit of the tax exemption contained in
the 1758 statute.35
In ruling against the purchasers' claim, the state Supreme
Court accepted the notion that a legislature could grant away its
taxing power. Nonetheless, the state high court ruled against the
purchasers' claim saying (1) that, in legislative contemplation, the
exemption was meant to be coupled with Indian possession; (2)
32. The commentary in this paragraph is drawn from Siegel, Contract,
supra note 6, at 57-66.
33. 11 U.S. 164 (1812).
34. See Siegel, Contract, supra note 6, at 46-52.

35. See Wilson, 11 U.S. at 165-66; State v. Wilson, 2 N.J.L. 218, 218-19
(1807).
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that repealing the statutory bar to sale repealed the tax
exemption; and (3) that, in any event, a clear statement was
necessary before it would interpret a contract as granting away
the state's sovereign power of taxation. 6
The Marshall Court reversed. It upheld the purchasers' claim
by casually construing the tax exemption as a covenant running
with the land, rather than as a covenant that was personal to the
Indian tribe, in order to create a contract with an obligation that
ran to subsequent purchasers of the tribe's land. Marshall's
reasoning was that the only value to the covenant came from the
tribe's ability to pass it on to subsequent parties. 7 This strikes me
as willful blindness on Marshall's part to the state's argument that
the purpose of the covenant was to prevent the possibility of the
land being seized for nonpayment of taxes while the Indians
possessed it."8
Dartmouth College v. Woodward 9 supports a similar
observation. Dartmouth College, which inaugurated Contract
Clause protection for corporate charters, is another Marshall
Court decision that became extraordinarily controversial later in
the century."' Yet, in Dartmouth College, both the state Supreme
Court and the Marshall Court agreed that the Contract Clause
should protect the charters of private corporations but not the
charters of public corporations." The state Supreme Court felt
that Dartmouth College, chartered in the mid-eighteenth century
and still the only institution of higher learning in the state, had
been set up for great public purposes -as corporations of its time
tended to be. 2 The Marshall Court ruled, however, that the
corporation was private because it had not been entirely
36. See Wilson, 2 N.J.L. at 221-26.
37. See Wilson, 11 U.S. at 167.
38. See Wilson, 2 N.J.L. at 222. The purpose of the transaction, the state

court said, was to give the tribe a permanent homeland and "this salutary
provision would have become nugatory in a few years, the Indians turned out

of possession, and the humane intentions of the Legislature frustrated,
through the improvident and incurable carelessness of these people, had their
lands been liable to be seized for taxes." Id. The tribe, not being much

involved in the cash economy, would have found it difficult to raise the
necessary cash for annual real property tax payments.
39. 17 U.S. 517 (1819).
40. See Siegel, Contract, supra note 6, at 32 n.148. For example, Gilded

Age legal scholar, Francis Wharton, contended that the Dartmouth College
was an early challenge to the survival of the Republic. Francis Wharton,
"Patches"on the Constitution, THE INDEPENDENT, January 10, 1889, reprinted
in JOHN BASSETr MOORE, A BRIEF SKETCH OF THE LIFE OF FRANCIS WHARTON
17, 19-20, 23 (1891).

41. Dartmouth College, 17 U.S. at 629-30; Dartmouth College v. Woodward,
1 N.H. 111, 115-17 (1817).

42. Dartmouth College, 1 N.H. at 117-20. In addition, the trustees, who
were the parties at bar, had no personal financial stake in the College. Id. at

122-23.
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constituted by public funds." What was ambiguous, in Marshall's
time, was the application of the public/private dichotomy; and the
Marshall court ruled in favor of a generous definition of the
private.
Finally, consider Ogden v. Saunders," in which Marshall
wrote his only dissent in a constitutional case. In his dissent,
Marshall wrote that bankruptcy laws that discharged debtors
"impaired the obligation of contract" even when the law preexisted
the contract being discharged.45 I have argued that Marshall's
dissent, which Story and Duvall joined, was a preemptive strike
against the validity of the increasingly popular "reserve clauses"
that were rapidly becoming the prime legislative means to free
states from the limitations imposed by the Dartmouth College
decision."6
CONCLUSION

In conclusion, controversy as well as consensus marks the
Marshall Court's Contract Clause jurisprudence. 7 Significantly,
controversy in Marshall's day was more subtle than it was later in
the century. But even if we set aside the differences that existed
among the judges of Marshall's time as too muted, the shifting
course of Contract Clause adjudication over the nineteenth
century makes it impossible to maintain that the Marshall, Taney,
43. DartmouthCollege, 17 U.S. at 629-32.
44. 25 U.S. 213 (1827).

45. Id. at 333 (Marshall, C.J., dissenting).
46. See Siegel, Contract, supra note 6, at 14-20.
Shortly after the
Dartmouth College decision, when granting corporate charters, states began to
reserve the power to make unilateral amendments. The "reserve" clause
doctrine was grounded in the view that contract obligations are whatever the
parties agree to, so long as their agreement is not proscribed by standing law.
This includes agreements by which one party agrees to abide by all
subsequent modifications decided upon by the other party. So clearly was the
reserve clause doctrine a part of nineteenth-century contract jurisprudence
that it was first broached in Dartmouth College, the first decision to extend
Contract Clause protection to corporate charters. See id. at 33-35.
47. Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. 87 (1810), Marshall's first Contract Clause
case, shows another example of subtle differences among the Court's justices,
differences in which Marshall supported more extensive protections than some
of his colleagues. Fletcher v. Peck stands for the proposition that Contract
Clause protections extend to contracts to which the state is a party. This was
a consensus doctrine that, as Ely argues, was anticipated since the Founding.
See Ely, supra 1009. Yet Justice Johnson dissented in Fletcher, objecting to
Marshall's extending Contract Clause protections to "executed" as well as
"executory" agreements.
Johnson's concern was that such an extensive
protection would impede the states' exercise of their eminent domain powers.
See Siegel, Contract, supra note 6, at 27 & 27 n.128. To this extent, then,
applying the Contract Clause to state land grants, which were executed
contracts, involved a modest dispute, one in which Marshall, once again, took
the more extensive view.
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Chase, Waite and Fuller courts all had a uniform approach to
constitutional protections of private property.

